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RITTER-WISEMAN   
 
DEPARTING FROM THE ORIGINAL GOALS OF THE U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES: DRUG SENTENCING 
DISPARITIES IN THE U.S. DISTRICT OF MARYLAND 
BY JEREMY RITTER-WISEMAN* 
INTRODUCTION 
In Fiscal Year 2018, the single most prosecuted type of federal 
crime in the United States District of Maryland was drug trafficking.1 
Drug trafficking, accounting for 32.3% of all federally prosecuted 
crimes in the District of Maryland, was more than double the amount of 
the second most prosecuted type of crime, Firearms, which accounted 
for only 15.2% of all prosecuted crimes.2 This number is also 5.3 per-
centage points above the national average for drug trafficking.3 Despite 
making up only 41.2% of Maryland’s total population,4 minorities ac-
count for 84.3% of all federally prosecuted drug crimes in Maryland 
since 2006.5 Although that statistic represents a problematic disparity in 
itself, this Comment will instead address a different area of sentencing 
disparity: the disparity between the rates of downward departures and 
variances given to white versus non-white drug offenders. This Com-
ment will argue that despite the implicit goal of the Sentencing Reform 
Act of 1984 (hereinafter “the SRA”)—and thus the creation and imple-
mentation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines—of remedying sen-
tencing disparities due to demographic differences such as race, there 
remains significant race disparities in the granting of downward depar-
tures and variances by district court judges. As a quasi-case study of this 
disparity, this Comment will present how this plays out in the United 
States District of Maryland. 
 
ã 2020 Jeremy Ritter-Wiseman 
* JD candidate, 2021, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. The author 
would like to thank Jim Wyda for his helpful guidance and useful edits and suggestions. He 
would also like to thank all the editors of the Journal of Race, Religion, Gender and Class. 
Finally, the author would like to thank his parents for their endless encouragement and support.  
1 See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, STATISTICAL INFORMATION PACKET, FISCAL YEAR 2018: DISTRICT 
OF MARYLAND 3, Table 1 (Aug. 2019), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-
and-publications/federal-sentencing-statistics/state-district-circuit/2018/md18.pdf. 
2 See id. 
3 See id. 
4 See Quick Facts: Maryland, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/MD 
(last visited Apr. 20, 2020). 
5 See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2006-2017 INTERACTIVE SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING 
STATISTICS Table 32 (2006-2017) (hereinafter “COMBINED SOURCEBOOKS”). 
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Part I of this Comment traces the history of the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines.6 This section will trace the movement towards 
sentencing reform beginning in the 1970s and leading to the enactment 
of the SRA.7 It will discuss the purported goals of the SRA—namely, 
the reduction of judicial discretion and the increase in uniformity in sen-
tencing.8 This section will also explain how the Sentencing Guidelines 
were altered as a result of the landmark Supreme Court decisions Ap-
prendi v. New Jersey, and United States v. Booker, the latter having ren-
dered the usage of the Guidelines advisory instead of mandatory.9 
Part II discusses the concepts of sentencing departures and sen-
tencing variances more generally.10 This section will first define the 
terms and will then explain how courts use departures and variances to 
alter sentences to go outside of the prescribed Guideline range.11 More 
importantly, this section will show how sentencing variances were es-
sentially created by the Supreme Court’s ruling in Booker, re-opening 
the door for judicial discretion and thus less uniformity in sentencing.12 
Part III then looks at sentencing data from the United States Dis-
trict of Maryland since 2006.13 The data reveals that in the District of 
Maryland, white drug offenders are treated with significantly more le-
niency than non-white drug offenders through the rate of downward de-
partures and variances.14 The data shows that offenders who commit 
crimes involving drugs such as Methamphetamine and Oxycontin/Ox-
ycodone, who are typically white, receive significantly more downward 
departures and variances, as compared to offenders who commit crimes 
involving Crack, PCP, and Heroin, who are typically non-white.15 This 
section also shows how this disparity in Maryland is reflective of a prob-
lem on the national level where the data shows similar disparities.16 
Part IV discusses how an offender’s criminal history might help 
explain the disparity outlined in Part III. 17 Yet, this section also argues 
 
6 See infra Part I. 
7 See infra Part I-A. 
8 See infra Part I-A. 
9 See infra Part I-B–C; see also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); United States v. 
Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 222 (2005) 
10 See infra Part II. 
11 See infra Part II-A. 
12 See infra Part II-B. 
13 See infra Part III. 
14 See infra Part III-A. 
15 See infra Part III-A. 
16 See infra Part III-B. 
17 See infra Part IV. 
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that the computation of an offender’s career history itself has racial im-
plications, including how the “career-offender” provision of the Guide-
lines unfairly punishes minorities, and the how the reality of over-polic-
ing in Baltimore City causes minorities to be arrested with greater 
frequency than white persons.18 
Based on the data discussed in this Comment, it appears that in 
the United States District of Maryland, race plays a role in the granting 
of departures and variances, and ultimately in the computation of one’s 
sentence.19 White drug offenders are receiving far more departures and 
variances than non-white drug offenders.20 To the reformers who pushed 
through sentencing reform in the 1970s and 80s, and to the proponents 
of greater uniformity in sentencing, this data represents a disheartening 
retreat to the pre-Guidelines era which was riddled with inconsistent 
sentencing.21 
I.  THE HISTORY OF THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
Modern federal sentencing has largely been determined by the 
United States Federal Sentencing Guidelines.22 Part I-A. provides a brief 
history of the impetus behind the enactment of the SRA, which led to 
the creation of the Guidelines.23 Part II-B. and Part II-C. then chart the 
changes the Guidelines underwent as a result of landmark Supreme 
Court rulings.24 
A. Enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 
The history of the United States Sentencing Commission and the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines (hereinafter “the Guidelines”) can be 
traced back to the writings of Judge Marvin E. Frankel.25 Frankel, a for-
mer judge of the United States District Court for the Southern District 
 
18 See infra Part IV-A-C 
19 See infra Part III-A. 
20 See infra Part III. 
21 See infra Part I-A. 
22 See Mission, U.S. SENT’G  COMM’N, https://www.ussc.gov/about-page (last visited Apr. 20, 
2020). 
23 See infra Part I-A. 
24 See infra Part II-B-C. 
25 See KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE 
FEDERAL COURTS 35 (1998). 
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of New York, conducted a study in 1972 into sentencing within the Sec-
ond Circuit.26 Drawing upon his findings, Frankel published his sentenc-
ing manifesto that same year, entitled: Criminal Sentences: Law without 
Order.27 In his book, Frankel calls for the formation of a “Commission 
on Sentencing,” which would be responsible for three things.28 First, the 
Commission would be responsible for studying “sentencing, correc-
tions, and parole.”29 The Commission would also formulate laws and 
rules, which would be directly informed by the Commission’s studies.30 
Third, and most important in Frankel’s eyes, the Commission would en-
act such rules, which would be binding on federal judges.31 
At the time, this proposition was somewhat radical as Congress 
had the sole power to promulgate sentencing rules. To confer this power 
to an independent Commission would delegate a lawmaking power 
away from Congress. However, in regards to sentencing, Frankel found 
it necessary for Congress to delegate such power in sentencing as, he 
notes, “relative details, numerous and cumulatively important, neither 
require nor are likely to receive from the legislature the necessary meas-
ure of steady attention.”32 Frankel was “deeply skeptical of judicial dis-
cretion,” and believed judicial discretion resulted in “arbitrary cruelties 
perpetrated daily.”33 
One of Frankel’s biggest admirers was Senator Edward M. Ken-
nedy.34 An equally fierce critic of the sentencing system at the time, 
Kennedy was the original sponsor of the SRA.35 After years of fruitless 
attempts to pass a sentencing reform bill, Kennedy’s—and thus 
Frankel’s—goal was finally realized when Congress passed the SRA in 
1984 with significant bipartisan support.36 In passing the SRA, Congress 
 
26 See id.; see also Frankel, Marvin, E., FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/his-
tory/judges/frankel-marvin-e (last visited Apr. 20, 2020). 
27 MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1972). 




32 FRANKEL, supra note 27, at 122. 
33 STITH & CABRANES, supra note 25, at 35–36 (quoting FRANKEL, supra, note 27, at 103)). 
34 Id. at 35 (Kennedy once dubbed Judge Frankel the “father of sentencing reform” (citing 128 
Cong. Rec. 26503 (1982)). 
35 Id. at 38 (Senator Kennedy had described sentencing in federal courts in markedly harsh 
terms including calling it “a disgrace,” “hopelessly inconsistent” and “desperately in need of 
reform”). 
36 Brent E. Newton and Dawinder S. Sidhu, The History of the Original United States Sentenc-
ing Commission, 1985-1987, 45 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1167, 1184 (2017). 
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had two primary goals.37 First, Congress wanted to increase “honesty in 
sentencing.”38 By “honesty,” Congress meant to remedy the scenario 
whereby a judge would sentence an individual to prison for a specific 
amount of time, only for that individual to be released by a Parole Com-
mission after completing a fraction of that sentence.39 
The second stated purpose was to narrow sentencing dispari-
ties.40 The enactment of the SRA sought to correct the problem where 
two offenders, convicted of similar crimes, would receive far different 
sentences merely because they were sentenced by different judges.41 
Known as the “inter-judge disparity,” a 1974 study published by the 
Federal Judicial Center revealed the depth of this problem by showing 
that fifty federal judges in the same circuit, who were given twenty hy-
pothetical cases, varied wildly in their proposed sentences.42 Senators 
who drafted the SRA cited this study, describing the variations in sen-
tences as “astounding.”43 
The primary tool in Congress’ toolbelt to address sentencing dis-
parities was one of Frankel’s creation, the U.S. Sentencing Commission 
(hereinafter “the Commission”).44 The Commission consisted of a bi-
partisan committee and two “nonvoting members.”45 The Commission 
was mandated to, among other things, draft guidelines that would avoid 
“unwarranted disparities among defendants . . . found guilty of similar 
criminal conduct while maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit indi-
vidualized sentences . . . by mitigating or aggravating factors not taken 
into account in the establishment of the guidelines.”46 
One type of disparity the Commission hoped to remedy was sen-
tencing disparities attributable to race.47 In the buildup to the passing of 
 
37 Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which 
They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 4 (1988) (citing Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 
Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837)). 
38 Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 54, 56, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. 
& ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3237, 3239)). 
39 Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 56, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS 3239))/ 
40 Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 38, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3221)). 
41 Newton & Sidhu, supra note 36, at 1178–79. 
42 Id. at 1179 (citing ANTHONY PARTRIDGE & WILLIAM B. ELDRIDGE, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE 
SECOND CIRCUIT SENTENCING STUDY: A REPORT TO THE JUDGES OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT 5, 9–
10 (1974)). 
43 Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 98–225, at 41 (1983)). 
44 Breyer, supra note37, at 5; Newton & Sidhu, supra note36, at 1184 (“Congress followed 
Judge Frankel’s suggestion, creating a bipartisan Commission . . . .”). 
45 Newton & Sidhu, supra note 36, at 1184 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1988)). 
46 Id. at 1185 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (1988)) (internal quotations omitted). 
47 Id. at 1180–81. 
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the SRA, it was “widely acknowledged” that demographic factors, es-
pecially race and gender, contributed to sentencing disparities.48 Partic-
ularly, studies revealed that one’s race may correlate to how harsh or 
lenient a judge would be in sentencing.49 Narrowing sentencing dispar-
ities was therefore a “key motivation” behind the promulgation of the 
sentencing guidelines.50 One of the co-sponsors of the SRA, then-Sena-
tor Joseph R. Biden of Delaware, underscored the need to cure the cur-
rent sentencing system of its invidious disparities during debate on the 
SRA: 
 
[U]nder the present sentencing system . . . most of the 
people who wind up in jail are people who are poor, and 
people who are black and people who are from a minor-
ity . . . [T]he studies show the white middle-class guy 
gets a more lenient sentence than the black guy, and you 
know that is kind of disturbing. We find out judges are 
not color blind and judges do not leave their baggage at 
home. And we found there is significant disparity in how 
judges apply the sentences when they see defendants.51 
 
After its creation, the Commission confirmed this uncomforta-
ble reality by conducting its own study which showed similar disparities 
attributable to race.52 Overall, in passing the SRA, and in authoring the 
Guidelines, unfair sentencing disparities due to race were top-of-mind 
to the proponents of sentencing reform.53   
 
48 Id. at 1180; see also William W. Wilkins, Jr. et al., The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: A 
Bold Approach to the Unwarranted Sentencing Disparity Problem, 2 CRIM. L.F. 355, 359 (1991) 
(citing Gary Kleck, Racial Discrimination in Criminal Sentencing, 46 AM. SOC. REV. 783, 784 
(1981) (“In his review of more than sixty empirical studies related to racial discrimination at 
sentencing, Gary Kleck summarized findings by identifying five categories of sentencing prac-
tices that might produce differential results based on race”)). 
49 See JOAN PETERSILIA, RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 3 (1983) (find-
ing evidence that minorities were treated more severely in sentencing: “[f]or the same crime and 
with similar criminal records, whites are more likely to get probation, to go to jail instead of 
prison, to receive shorter sentences, and to serve less time behind bars than minority offenders”). 
50 Lucius T. Outlaw III, Time for a Divorce: Uncoupling Drug Offenses from Violent Offenses 
in Federal Sentencing Law, Policy, and Practice, 44 AM. J. CRIM. L. 220, 228 (2017); see also 
Wilkins, Jr. et al., supra note 48, at 364 (noting that the “elimination of unwarranted sentencing 
disparity” was a “principal goal” of the SRA). 
51 Wilkins, Jr. et al., supra note 48, at 366 (quoting 130 Cong. Rec. 839 (1984)). 
52 Id. at 366–67. 
53 Newton & Sidhu, supra note 36, at 1180–81 (citing Wilkins, Jr. et al., supra note 48, at 362 
(“As stated by the original chair of the Commission, Judge William W. Wilkins, Jr., and two 
leading original staff members in 1991: ‘Suffice it to say it was against this backdrop of such 
unfair sentencing practices that the most recent attempt at sentencing reform was conceived and 
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B. Apprendi v. New Jersey: The Precursor to Booker 
In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Supreme Court addressed the 
constitutionality of a New Jersey hate crime statute.54 The statute pro-
vided for “an extended term of imprisonment” if the trial judge found 
that a defendant committed the underlying offense with the purpose of 
intimidating a protected subclass.55 In 1994, Petitioner Charles C. Ap-
prendi, Jr. pleaded guilty to two counts of second-degree possession of 
a firearm for an unlawful person, carrying a sentence of between five 
and ten years in prison, after he admitted to firing bullets into the home 
of an African-American family.56 As part of the plea deal, the State re-
served the right to request an enhanced sentence under New Jersey’s 
hate crime statute and Mr. Apprendi reserved the right to challenge the 
enhancement on constitutional grounds.57 Following a plea hearing 
where the trial judge accepted Mr. Apprendi’s guilty plea, the State 
moved for an enhanced sentence.58 Soon after, the trial judge held an 
evidentiary hearing for the purpose of determining Mr. Apprendi’s “pur-
pose” for the shooting.59 After hearing testimony, the judge found by a 
preponderance of the evidence that “the [underlying] crime was moti-
vated by racial bias” and consequently enhanced Mr. Apprendi’s sen-
tence.60 
The Supreme Court granted cert to determine whether the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires “that a factual 
determination authorizing an increase in the maximum prison sentence 
. . . be made by a jury on the basis of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”61 
Writing for a 5-4 majority, Justice Stevens referred to the reasonable 
doubt standard as “vital” in order to protect against erroneous loss of 
“liberty upon conviction,” as well as the stigma of conviction.62 There-
fore, it follows: 
 
developed, culminating in legislation that created the . . . Commission and the federal sentencing 
guidelines’”)). 
54 530 U.S. 466, 468–69 (2000). 
55 Id. (quoting N.J STAT. ANN. § 2c:44-3(e) (1999)) (internal quotations omitted)). 
56 Id. at 469–70. 
57 Id. at 470. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 470-71. 
60 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 471 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. 143a); Id. at 470–71 (stating that if 
the trial judge found that there was no motivation based on racial bias, the convictions would 
have carried a maximum sentence in the aggregate of 20 years. But because the trial judge ap-
plied the enhancement, the maximum on that one count alone would be 20 years). 
61 Id. at 469. 
62 Id. at 484 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970)). 
There, the Court found unconstitutional a New York statute permitting a judge to find by a 
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[i]f a defendant faces punishment beyond that provided 
by statute when an offense is committed under certain 
circumstances but not others, it is obvious that both the 
loss of liberty and the stigma attaching to the offense are 
heightened; it necessarily follows that the defendant 
should not—at the moment the State is put to proof of 
those circumstances—be deprived of protections that 
have, until that point, unquestionably attached.63 
In other words, if a defendant faces a sentence enhancement that 
goes beyond the bounds of the statute and is based on a fact that is not 
an element of the crime, that fact should have to be proven to a jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt.64 
At the heart of the Court’s reasoning was the apparent lack of a 
distinction between an “element” of a crime and a “sentencing factor.”65 
To the Court, the analysis rested on what effect a factor has on the de-
fendant’s punishment.66 If a sentencing factor “expose[s] the defendant 
to a greater punishment,” it is indistinguishable from an element of the 
offense which must be submitted to the jury.67 
This is not to say, however, that a “sentencing factor” has no 
meaning. The Court determined that while a “sentencing factor” can 
have an aggravating or mitigating effect in sentencing, it nevertheless 
“supports a specific sentence within the range authorized by the jury’s 
finding that the defendant is guilty of a particular offense.”68 Con-
versely, an enhancement based on a “sentencing factor” is an increase 
beyond the maximum authorized sentence, and is thus the “functional 
equivalent” to an element of the offense.69 Moreover, the holding by the 
Court declared that an element of an offense is “any fact that increases 
 
preponderance of the evidence whether a juvenile had committed a crime, violating the Four-
teenth Amendment. The decision set the prevailing standard that every element of a crime must 
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to convict). In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 359–64. 
63 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 484. 
64 Id.; Id. at 490 (“Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty 
for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt”). 
65 Id. at 494 (referencing McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 86 (1986) overruled by Al-
leyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 105 (2013)). 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 n.19 (emphasis in original). 
69 Id. 
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the maximum statutory penalty for the crime.”70 In her dissenting opin-
ion, Justice O’Connor forebodingly highlights that the Court’s ruling 
essentially invalidates the Guidelines.71 Because Apprendi severely lim-
its a judge’s ability to make factual determinations, which the Guide-
lines rely heavily on, the Court’s ruling in Apprendi paved the way for 
the Court’s ruling that followed in Booker.72 
C. United States v. Booker: The Reintroduction of Judicial 
Discretion 
The immediate precursor to the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
United States v. Booker was the Court’s decision in Blakely v. Washing-
ton, in 2004.73 In Blakely, the Court addressed Washington State’s Sen-
tencing Reform Act, which permitted a judge to depart from a statutory 
maximum if the judge found that the defendant acted with “deliberate 
cruelty.”74 In other words, a judge could enhance a sentence based on a 
finding of fact that was not submitted to a jury. Applying their ruling 
from Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that a defendant in Washington 
state had “the right to insist that the prosecutor prove to a jury all facts 
legally essential to the punishment,” and found that the sentence at ques-
tion, as applied by the Washington state judge, violated the defendant’s 
Sixth Amendment rights.75 In a dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer dubi-
ously pondered how the Court’s holding could be reconciled with the 
Guidelines, foreshadowing the Court’s holding in Booker only six 
months later.76 
1. The Court’s Holding 
Freddie Booker was charged with possession with intent to dis-
tribute at least 50 grams of crack cocaine and was found guilty by a jury 
of violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).77 The statute provided for a minimum 
sentence of 10 years in prison.78 When combined with Booker’s criminal 
 
70 Andrew J. Fuchs, Note, The Effect of Apprendi v. New Jersey on the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines: Blurring the Distinction Between Sentencing Factors and Elements of a Crime, 69 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1399, 1419 (2001). 
71 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 544 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
72 See Fuchs, supra note 70, at 1434. 
73 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
74 Id. at 300 (citing WASH. REV. CODE §9.94A.390(2)(h)(iii) (statute transferred to WASH. REV. 
CODE 9.94A.535 (2019)). 
75 Id. at 313 (emphasis in original). 
76 Id. at 346 (Breyer, J., dissenting); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226-27 (2005). 
77 Booker, 543 U.S. at 227. 
78  Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii))(2018)). 
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history, the Guidelines required the district court judge to assign Booker 
a “base” sentence of at least 210 months, nearly 22 years in prison.79 
The district court judge then held a post-trial sentencing pro-
ceeding and found by a preponderance of the evidence that Booker pos-
sessed an additional 566 grams and that he was also guilty of obstructing 
justice.80 The judge’s additional findings required Booker’s base sen-
tence to be increased to a minimum of 360 months, or 30 years in 
prison.81 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit found that the sentence did not 
comport with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Apprendi and reversed.82 
The Supreme Court granted the Government’s petition for writ of certi-
orari to determine whether the Court’s “Apprendi line of cases applies 
to the Sentencing Guidelines, and if so, what portions of the Guidelines 
remain in effect.”83 The Court’s opinion in Booker was delivered in two 
parts.84 In the first opinion, Justice Stevens addressed the constitution-
ality of the Guidelines.85 Upon finding the mandatory requirement of the 
Guidelines to be unconstitutional, Justice Breyer then attempted to rec-
oncile the Guidelines with the Court’s constitutional holding.86 
Justice Stevens first addressed whether the application of the 
Guidelines offended the Booker’s Sixth Amendment protections.87 
Finding “no distinction of constitutional significance between the Fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines and the Washington procedures” at issue in 
Blakely, the Court held that “the Sixth Amendment as construed in 
Blakely” applies to the Guidelines as well.88 Therefore, any fact “which 
is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized 
by the facts . . . must be . . . proved to a jury beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”89 
Importantly, Justice Stevens noted that if the Guidelines were 
instead merely advisory, instead of mandatory, “their use would not im-
plicate the Sixth Amendment,” because, as Stevens points out, the Court 
 
79 Id.; U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.1 (Nov. 2003), 
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-manual/2003/manual/CHAP4.pdf. 
80 Booker, 543 U.S. at 227. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 227–28. 
83 Id. at 229. The Court also granted cert to address a similar sentencing scenario regarding 
Respondent Ducan Fanfan. However, for brevity’s sake, because the question presented to the 
Court was unchanged as between Booker and Fanfan, only the facts from Respondent Booker’s 
case are reproduced here. Id. at 227–28. 
84 Id. at 225. 
85 Booker, 543 U.S. at 230. 
86 Id. at 245–46. 
87 Id. at 226. 
88 Id. at 226–27, 233. 
89 Id. at 244. 
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recognizes a sentencing judge’s discretionary authority when imposing 
a sentence “within a statutory range.”90 
Justice Breyer’s opinion then attempted to salvage what he could 
of the Guidelines by “determin[ing] what Congress would have in-
tended in light of” the Court’s constitutional holding.91 Breyer con-
cluded that had Congress “been faced with the constitutional jury trial 
requirement” from the Court’s constitutional holding, Congress “likely 
would not have passed the same Sentencing Act.”92 Consequently, the 
Court adopted an approach that excised two provisions of the Guidelines 
in order to reconcile Congress’ intent with the Court’s constitutional 
holding.93 
The first excised provision makes the Guidelines binding on fed-
eral judges, thus rendering the Guidelines advisory, not mandatory.94 
Breyer, one of the architects of the Guidelines, emphasizes that while 
the Court is rendering the Guidelines advisory, the Court does not mean 
to diminish the “strong connection between the sentence imposed and 
the offender’s real conduct,” which was integral to Congress’ attempt to 
increase uniformity in sentencing.95 
The Court further stressed real offense conduct, that is, the “real 
conduct that underlies the crime of conviction,” as being necessary to a 
system that reduces sentencing disparities and promotes uniformity, 
which was one of Congress’ basic goals in passing the SRA.96 Moreo-
ver, de-emphasis on real conduct would have “particularly troubling 
consequences” regarding prosecutorial power, according to Breyer.97 In-
stead of a judge basing a sentence upon the actual conduct of the of-
fender, sentences would largely be determined by the “conduct the pros-
ecutor chose to charge,” which the Court noted was a power that the 
 
90 Booker, 543 U.S. at 233. 
91 Id. at 246 (citing Denver Area Ed. Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 
727, 767 (1996)) (internal quotations removed). 
92 Id. at 258. 
93 Id. at 246. The second provision the Court severed from Act is the provision setting forth 
“standards of review on appeal, including de novo review of departures from the applicable 
Guidelines range, see [18 U.S.C.] § 3742(e),” because that provision “contains critical cross-
references to the (now-excised) § 3553(b)(1) and consequently must be severed and excised for 
similar reasons” (emphasis in original). Id. at 259–60. Although a consequential ruling in itself, 
that Court’s excision of that provision is irrelevant to the topic of this paper and is thus un-
addressed. 
94 Id. at 245. 
95 Booker, 543 U.S. at 246. 
96 Id. at 250, 253. 
97 Id. at 256. 
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SRA vested in judges.98 Thus, to help preserve the SRA’s emphasis on 
real-offense conduct, the Court urged that even though the Guidelines 
would not be advisory, the SRA “nonetheless requires judges to take 
account of the Guidelines together with other sentencing goals.”99 
In sum, Breyer explains how the Court’s ruling still advances the 
impetus that led to the Guidelines being enacted in the first place: 
“[t]hese features of the remaining system, while not the system Con-
gress enacted, nonetheless continue to move sentencing in Congress’ 
preferred direction, helping to avoid excessive sentencing disparities 
while maintaining flexibility sufficient to individualize sentences where 
necessary.”100 Moreover, the Court’s ruling kept the Sentencing Com-
mission intact, further directing it to continue to “writ[e] Guidelines, 
collect[] information . . . undertake[] research,” and to revise the Guide-
lines accordingly.101 Breyer concluded by stressing that the Court’s de-
cision was not the final say on the matter, as Congress remained free to 
amend the SRA to comport with the Constitution in a way that “Con-
gress judges best for the federal system of justice.”102 
2. The Effect on the Guidelines 
Unsurprisingly, Booker was seen as “an earthquake” to the sen-
tencing status quo.103 However, preceding Booker was a long line of Su-
preme Court decisions that increasingly chipped away at the Guide-
lines.104 One of the most significant immediate changes from Booker 
 
98 Id. “[T]he power to decide, based on relevant information about the offense and the offender, 
which defendants merit heavier punishment.” Id. at 257; see also David Yellen, Reforming the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines’ Misguided Approach to Real-Offense Sentencing, 58 STAN. L. 
REV. 267, 268 (2005) (explaining the opposite of real-offense sentencing, known as “charge-
offense sentencing.” Charge-offense sentencing refers to the setting of a sentence or sentencing 
range “based entirely on the statute of conviction”). 
99 Id. at 259; see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2018) (other sentencing goals includes, inter alia, “[T]he 
need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have 
been found guilty of similar conduct”). 
100 Booker, 543 U.S. at 264–65. 
101 Id. at 264. 
102 Id. at 265. 
103 Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Disparity: Assessing 
the Role of Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker, 123 YALE L. J. 1, 15 (2013). 
104 See e.g., Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 248 (1999) (holding that “facts determining 
a statutory sentencing range” must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (holding that any fact other than a 
prior conviction which would increase the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum 
“must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt”); Ring v. Arizona, 536 
U.S. 584, 589 (2002) (holding that capital defendants, under the Sixth Amendment, are entitled 
to have “any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment,” 
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was that federal sentencing judges gained far more discretion.105 The 
other significant development, likely a direct cause of the first, was the 
rate at which judges sentenced offenders to sentences within the pre-
scribed Guideline range. In the year prior to Booker, 72% of all federal 
sentences were within the Guideline range, meaning 28% of all federal 
offenders received some time of departure, either downward or up-
ward.106 In the eleven months following Booker, the percentage of sen-
tences that fell within the range dropped to 61.2% nationally.107 This 
was more than double than the previous largest year-to-year variation in 
sentence-rates that fell within the Guidelines.108 This statistic evidences 
the single most consequential change stemming from Booker—specifi-
cally, that sentencing judges were now more willing to use their discre-
tion to go outside of the Guidelines. This development was also re-
flected in the Commission’s creation of a new statistical category in 
response to Booker: the “variance.”109 
II. UNDERSTANDING DEPARTURES AND VARIANCES 
A. Departures and Variances, Defined 
As defined by the United States Sentencing Commission, a sen-
tence departure can be one of three things.110 A departure can be a sen-
tence that falls “outside the guideline range.”111 It can be a sentence that 
is “otherwise different from the guideline sentence,” or a departure can 
be an “assignment of a criminal history category other than the other-
wise applicable criminal history category, in order to effect a sentence 
outside the applicable guideline range.”112 A departure is most often trig-
gered upon a government motion “to reward cooperation.”113 
 
be presented to a jury); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305–06 (2004) (finding a Wash-
ington state statute that permitted a judge to increase a sentence beyond the statutory maximum 
based on a fact that was not presented to the jury as offensive to the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments in light of the Court’s holding from Apprendi). 
105 Frank O. Bowman, III, The Year of Jubilee . . . Or Maybe Not: Some Preliminary Observa-
tions About the Operation of the Federal Sentencing System After Booker, 43 HOUSTON L. REV. 
279, 280 (2006). 
106 Id. at 297. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 300. 
109 Id. at 305. 
110 U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, PRIMER: DEPARTURES AND VARIANCES 1 (2019), 
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/primers/2019_Primer_Departure_Vari-
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A “downward departure” is defined as “a court’s discretionary 
imposition of a sentence more lenient than the standard [G]uidelines 
propose, as when the facts militate in favor of a lesser punishment.”114 
Accordingly, an upward departure is a harsher sentence than what the 
Guidelines propose, “when the court concludes that a criminal’s history 
did not take into account additional offenses committed by the pris-
oner.”115 Simply put, a downward departure adjusts the Guideline range 
to below what the range would otherwise be, and an upward departure 
adjusts the range to go above it.116 
Whereas a sentencing departure diverges from what the Guide-
lines propose based on reasons contained within the Guidelines them-
selves, a sentencing variance is a divergence from the Guidelines based 
solely on the “exercise of the court’s discretion under § 3553(a).”117 
Eighteen U.S.C. § 3553(a) directs sentencing judges to impose sen-
tences that comply with the following sentencing purposes: 
the need . . . (A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, 
to promote respect for the law, and to provide just pun-
ishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deter-
rence to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from 
further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide the 
defendant with needed educational or vocational train-
ing, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the 
most effective manner[.]118 
In other words, departures were incorporated as part of the 
Guidelines when the Commission first established them, permitting 
judges to exercise discretion, but limiting those discretions to “departure 
authority” contemplated by the Commission’s policy statements.119 Var-
iances, though, are sentences that are “neither within the applicable 
[g]uidelines range nor imposed pursuant to the departure authority in 
the Commission’s policy statements.”120Although slight, the differences 
between departures and variances are important as they are subject to 
 
114 Downward Departure, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
115 Upward Departure, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
116 Compare supra note 114, with supra note 115. 
117 United States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 317 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Floyd, 
499 F.3d 308, 311 (3d Cir. 2007)). 
118 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)–(D) (2018). 
119 PRIMER ON DEPARTURES AND VARIANCES, supra note 110, at 2 (a sentence with a departure 
is a sentence technically still within the Guidelines as it is imposed “pursuant to the departure 
provisions of the policy statements in the guidelines” (citing United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 
103, 111 n.9 (2d Cir. 2005)). 
120 Id. (alteration in original) (citing Crosby, 397 F.3d at 111 n.9)). 
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different analysis and notice requirements.121 Moreover, when a judge 
believes that a sentence under the Guidelines is too harsh, and the avail-
able departures offer no recourse, the judge may instead vary to go out-
side of the Guidelines.122 
B. Booker and Variances 
Booker had little to no effect on sentencing departures.123 Con-
trarily, sentencing variances were essentially created by the Court’s 
holding in Booker.124 Variances grant district courts the ultimate author-
ity when imposing a sentence, “regardless of what the guideline range 
is found to be,” if the court views the sentence as “sufficient, but not 
greater than necessary” to meet the goals outlined in § 3553(a).125 A 
critical case in understanding Booker’s effect on how courts may vary, 
especially in regard to drug cases, is Kimbrough v. United States.126 
In Kimbrough, the Supreme Court addressed a portion of the 
Guidelines that exhibited a substantial disparity in punishments regard-
ing crack and powder cocaine.127 As enacted, the Guidelines imposed 
the same punishment for a drug trafficker dealing in crack cocaine as 
one dealing in 100 times more powder cocaine.128 The Court held that a 
district court judge “may determine . . . that . . . a within-Guidelines sen-
tence is ‘greater than necessary’ to serve the objectives of sentencing,” 
as established in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).129 When doing so, the judge is 
permitted to consider “the disparity between the Guidelines’ treatment 
of crack and powder cocaine offenses.”130 
Kimbrough was important for two reasons. First, it was the first 
time the Supreme Court addressed the “demonstrably false predicate 
 
121 Id. at 44 (“Courts have held that variances are not subject to the guideline analysis for de-
partures”). 
122 Id. (“In some situations, a prohibited ground for departure may be a valid basis for a vari-
ance”). 
123 See id. at 10 (expounding on the impact of Booker on “Criminal History Departures,” by 
noting that “since the 2005 Booker decision, courts may vary, rather than depart, from the guide-
lines” when considering departures based on an offender’s criminal history); see also id. at 13 
(regarding Booker’s effect, or lack thereof, on substantial assistance motions, explaining that 
“[s]ince Booker, the procedure for granting a substantial assistance motion has remained largely 
unchanged”). 
124 See PRIMER ON DEPARTURES AND VARIANCES, supra note 110, at 10, 13. 
125 Id. at 44 (emphasis added) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2018)). 
126 See infra note 134. 
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understandings” of crack offenses and the people who commit them.131 
The Court noted that in a series of reports, the Sentencing Commission 
concluded that the large disparity reflected in the differing punishments 
between crack and powder cocaine engenders distrust of the criminal 
justice system due to the “widely-held perception” that the disparity is 
driven by race.132 After numerous pleas to Congress to reduce the dis-
parate ratio, the Commission independently implemented a “modest 
amendment” to ameliorate the disparity, but conceded that the amend-
ment represented only “a partial remedy.”133 
Secondly, Kimbrough established the precedent for courts to 
vary from the Guidelines based solely on “policy disagreements.”134 Re-
affirming their holding in Kimbrough in a later case, the Court acknowl-
edged that its holding “was a recognition of district courts’ authority to 
vary from the crack cocaine guidelines based on policy disagreement 
with them, and not simply based on an individualized determination that 
they yield an excessive sentence in a particular case.”135 
Other than permitting courts to vary from the Guidelines, what 
Booker did more than anything, though, was to reintroduce judicial dis-
cretion back into the sentencing process.136 Beginning with Judge 
Frankel’s work on illuminating the alleged evils of judicial discretion, 
the sentencing reform movement hoped to rid unwelcome judicial dis-
cretion through the passage of the SRA.137 The original purpose of stat-
utorily requiring judges to abide by the Guidelines was the single most 
important factor in remedying invidious sentencing disparities.138 Thus, 
by allowing federal district judges to vary from the Guidelines recom-
mendation, the underlying purposes of the SRA and the Guidelines were 
undone by the Court’s decision in Booker.139 The following data on drug 
 
131 Brief for The American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Kim-
brough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007) (No. 06-6330). 
132 Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 98 (citing U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: COCAINE 
AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 103 (May 2002)) (internal quotations omitted); the Court 
also notes that “[a]pproximately 85 percent of defendants convicted of crack offenses in federal 
court are black; thus the severe sentences required by the 100-to-1 ratio are imposed ‘primarily 
upon black offenders’.” Id. 
133 Id. at 99–100 (citing Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 
72 Fed. Reg. 28571-72 (2007)). 
134 Leading Cases, 122 HARV. L. REV. 276, 326 (2008). 
135 PRIMER ON DEPARTURES AND VARIANCES, supra note 110, at 54 (emphasis in original) (cit-
ing Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 264 (2009) (per curiam)). 
136 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245–46 (2005). 
137 See supra Part I-A. 
138 Wilkins, Jr. et al., supra note 48, at 369. 
139 See Booker, 543 U.S. at 245–46. 
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sentencing in the District of Maryland highlights how the granting of 
departures and variances has introduced new disparities since Booker. 
III. THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT OF MARYLAND 
A. Disparities in the Granting of Departures and Variances Based 
on Race 
Between 2006 and 2017, the United States District of Maryland 
saw 9,280 offenders prosecuted for a federal crime.140 Of those 9,280 
offenders, over one third were drug offenders.141 Of those offenders, the 
ones prosecuted for crimes involving certain drug-types, such a Meth-
amphetamine and Oxycodone/Oxycontin, are predominantly white.142 
Conversely, other offenders, the ones prosecuted for crimes involving 
drugs such as Crack Cocaine, Heroin, and PCP, are mostly non-white.143 
What the following data shows is that, in the District of Maryland, the 
drug-types with a higher percentage of white offenders result in far more 
lenient sentences through downward departures and variances than 
drug-types with mostly non-white offenders. 
Pursuant to 28 U.S. Code § 997, the United States Sentencing 
Commission issues an annual report to each branch of government, de-
tailing “the activities of the Commission.”144 The Commission refers to 
these reports as the Commission’s “Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing 
Statistics.”145 The Sourcebook contains statistics on “the application of 
the federal sentencing guidelines” and provides national data as well as 
data on individual United States districts and circuits.146 Additionally, 
the Commission provides an “Interactive Sourcebook,” which allows 
for the aggregation of multiple years of data.147 To observe how depar-
tures and variances have played-out since Booker, I looked at the com-
bined statistics in the District of Maryland, from fiscal years 2006 to 
2017.148 
 
140 COMBINED SOURCEBOOKS, supra note 5. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 See COMBINED SOURCEBOOKS, supra note 5, for explanation of “non-white offenders.” 
144 28 U.S.C. § 997 (1984). 
145 U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2018 ANNUAL REPORT AND  SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING 
STATISTICS 28 (2019), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publica-
tions/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2018/2018-Annual-Report-and-Sourcebook.pdf. 
146 Id. 
147 COMBINED SOURCEBOOKS, supra note 5. 
148 2006 is the year after Booker, and thus the first year where a judge was allowed to go outside 
of the Guidelines range. 
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The Sourcebook allows one to identify the race composition of 
drug offenders in each drug-type. For instance, between 2006-2017, 
there have been 1,070 individuals convicted of a crime involving “Pow-
der Cocaine,” in the District of Maryland, of which 67.2% are black.149 
Below is a table showing the race composition of drug offenders in each 
drug-type. 
 
Table 1: Race of Drug Offenders in Drug-Type in the Dis-
trict of Maryland (2006-2017)150 
 













caine 1,070 15.5 67.2 16.8 0.5 84.5 
Crack Cocaine 738 8.0 87.9 4.1 0.0 92.0 
Heroin 834 7.6 85.3 7.0 0.2 92.5 
Marijuana 228 28.1 62.3 5.3 4.4 72.0 
Methampheta-
mine 64 59.4 10.9 9.4 20.3 40.6 
Oxycodone/Ox-
ycontin 133 53.4 42.1 2.3 2.3 46.7 
PCP 74 5.4 91.9 2.7 0.0 94.6 
 
The table shows that the drug types with the largest percentage 
of white offenders are Methamphetamine (hereinafter “Meth”) and Ox-
ycodone/Oxycontin (hereinafter “Oxy”), consisting of 59.4% and 
53.4% white offenders respectively.152 Conversely, the drug types with 
the largest percentage of non-white offenders are Crack Cocaine, Her-
oin, and PCP,153 all of which are above 90%.154  
Below is a table that shows sentences, relative to Guideline 
ranges, for each drug-type. It shows the percent receiving sentences 
 
149 COMBINED SOURCEBOOKS, supra note 5. 
150 Id. This data was obtained through the Commission’s Interactive Sourcebook. Once you 
choose a certain table to view, in this instance, Table 34 of the 2017 Interactive Sourcebook 
titled “Race of Drug Offenders in Each Drug Type,” you can filter the data to show all offenders 
since 2006, and also narrow to view only the District of Maryland. Id. 
151 This statistic is not included in the COMBINED SOURCEBOOKS but it is included here to rep-
resent offenses committed by minority groups in total. It includes offenders identified as Black, 
Hispanic, Native American/Alaskan Native, Asian or Pacific Islander, Multi-Racial, and Other. 
152 COMBINED SOURCEBOOKS, supra note 5. 
153 Phencyclidine, also known as “PCP” or “angel dust,” is a hallucinogenic drug. Phencycli-
dine, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN. (Mar. 2020), https://www.deadiver-
sion.usdoj.gov/drug_chem_info/pcp.pdf. 
154 COMBINED SOURCEBOOKS, supra note 5. 
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within the range prescribed by the Guidelines; the total percentage all 
upward departures and variances; the percentage who receive a §5K1.1 
departure;155 the percentage of those receiving all other downward de-
partures; and the percentage who receive a downward variance. 
 
Table 2: Sentences Relative to the Guidelines Range for Drug Offenders in Each 
Primary Drug Type in the District of Maryland (2006-2017)156 
 



























Powder Cocaine 1,071 28.7 2.0 39.8 16.7 11.9 
Crack Cocaine 738 34.0 2.2 31.8 19.0 12.7 
Heroin 833 29.9 3.2 31.2 24.1 10.9 
Marijuana 228 30.7 1.3 35.1 15.3 15.4 
Methampheta-
mine 64 12.5 0.0 56.3 10.9 18.8 
Oxycodone/Oxy-
contin 133 14.3 0.0 42.9 19.6 23.4 
PCP 74 43.2 1.4 27.0 13.5 14.9 
 
There are a few figures of note in this table. The column labeled 
“§5K1.1,” pertains to one of the most frequently utilized downward 
departures.160 This provision of the Guidelines allows the court to depart 
from the Guideline range only upon a motion by the prosecutor “stating 
that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in the 
investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an 
offense.”161 From the table, the drug types receiving the most §5K1.1 
 
155 See supra note 145. 
156 COMBINED SOURCEBOOKS, supra note 5. 
157 This column combines the following categories: Upward Departures; Upward Departures 
w/ Booker; Above Range w/ Booker; Remaining Above Range. Id. 
158 This column combines the following categories: § 5K3.1 – Early Disposition; Other Gov’t 
Sponsored; Downward Departure; Downward Departure w/ Booker. Id. 
159 This column combined the categories, “Below Range w/ Booker,” and “Remaining Below 
Range.” Id. 
160 COMBINED SOURCEBOOKS, supra note 5. 
161 U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL §5K1.1 (Nov. 2018), 
https://www.ussc.gov/guidelines/2018-guidelines-manual/2018-chapter-5#5k11. Upon such 
motion from the government, a court may depart for reasons that include, but are not limited to, 
the following: “(1) the court’s evaluation of the significance and usefulness of the defendant’s 
assistance, taking into consideration the government’s evaluation of the assistance rendered; (2) 
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departures, are: Meth (56.3%) and Oxy (42.9%).162 Referring back to 
Table 1, Meth and Oxy also have the largest percentage of white offend-
ers of all of the drug types.163 Conversely, the drugs offenders receiving 
the least amount of §5K1.1 departures are those who are charged with 
crimes involving PCP (27%), Crack Cocaine (31.8%), and Heroin 
(35.1%).164 Again referring back to Table 1, these three drug types also 
include the largest percentage of non-white offenders.165  
Another figure that stands out is the column labeled, “Down-
ward Variance.”166 These are sentences in which the court has imposed 
a sentence that goes below the Guideline range, citing a reason based 
not on the Guidelines, but on 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).167 Again, the drug 
offenders receiving the most downward variances are offenders who are 
prosecuted for Oxy (23.4%)168 and Meth (18.8%) related offenses.169 To 
show the stark disparity in sentencing based on the drug-type, Table 3, 
below, shows the percent of non-white offenders and the total percent-
age of all downward departures and variances.  
  
 
the truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of any information or testimony provided by the 
defendant; (3) the nature and extent of the defendant’s assistance; (4) any injury suffered, or any 
danger or risk of injury to the defendant or his family resulting from his assistance; (5) the 
timeliness of the defendant’s assistance.” Id. 




166 See supra note 157. 
167 See supra note 118. 
168 It is important to note that while the rest of the drugs mentioned in this paper carry manda-
tory minimum sentences, crimes involving the illegal possession or sale of Oxycodone/Oxycon-
tin do not. See 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2018). 
169 COMBINED SOURCEBOOKS, supra note 5. 
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Table 3: Percentage of Non-White Offenders by Drug Type Combined with Per-
centage of Total Downward Departures and Variances by Drug Type in the Dis-
trict of Maryland (2006-2017)170 
 
Drug Type Number Non-White To-tal (%) 
Total Down-
ward (%)171 
Powder Cocaine 1,071 84.5 68.4 
Crack Cocaine 738 92.0 63.5 
Heroin 833 92.5 66.2 
Marijuana 228 72.0 65.8 
Methamphetamine 64 40.6 85.9 
Oxycodone/Oxycon-
tin 133 46.7 86.0 
PCP 74 94.6 55.4 
 
Here, it can be clearly seen that the drug types with the lowest 
percentage of non-white offenders, PCP and Crack Cocaine, by far, re-
ceive the smallest percentage of total downward departures and vari-
ances.172 Conversely, the drug types with the highest percentage of white 
offenders, Oxy and Meth, have significantly higher rates of downward 
departures and variances.173 Because there seems to be an apparent cor-
relation between drug-type and race, and because there is further corre-
lation between drug-type and one’s chances of receiving a downward 
departure or variance, these numbers reveal a serious sentencing dispar-
ity attributable to one’s race at play in the District of Maryland. How-
ever, this trend is not confined to the District of Maryland alone. 
B. Reflection of a National Problem 
The data outlined in the preceding subsection is also borne out 
in the national statistics, highlighting a larger problem. The following 




171 This column combines the following categories: §5K1.1 Substantial Assistance; §5K3.1 
Early Disposition; Other Gov’t Sponsored; Downward Departure; Downward Departure w/ 
Booker; Below Range w/ Booker; Remaining Below Range. Id. 
172 See supra Table 3. 
173 See supra Table 3. 
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Table 4: National Percentage of Non-White Offenders by Drug Type Combined 
with Percentage of Total Downward Departures and Variances by Drug Type 
(2006-2017)174 
 
Drug Type Number Non-White To-tal (%) 
Total Down-
ward (%) 
Powder Cocaine 64,381 86.6 52.8 
Crack Cocaine 46,209 92.0 50.6 
Heroin 24,574 84.8 59.0 
Marijuana 64,180 77.2 47.0 
Methamphetamine 64,822 55.5 63.0 
Oxycodone/Oxycon-
tin 7,462 35.6 70.1 
PCP 734 96.0 55.7 
 
Although the disparities are a little less stark, the same pattern 
can be seen. The drug-type with the lowest percentage of non-white 
offenders, Oxy, has the highest rate of downward departures and vari-
ances.175 The drug-type with the second lowest percentage of non-white 
offenders, Meth, also has the second highest rate of total downward de-
partures and variances.176 
Looking then at the two drug-types with the highest percentage 
of non-white offenders, PCP and Crack Cocaine, they appear to be 
granted the least amount of downward departures and variances, with 
the exception of marijuana.177 These statistics largely comport with the 
conclusion drawn using the data from the District of Maryland.  
IV. AN OFFENDER’S CRIMINAL HISTORY  
It would be naïve and improper to assume that the discrepancies 
outlined in the preceding section can be explained by racial bias among 
 
174 COMBINED SOURCEBOOKS, supra note 5. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. 
177 The low amount of marijuana departures and variances can be best explained by the Guide-
lines’ lenient treatment of marijuana crimes. For instance, an offender who has between 10-20 
kilograms of marijuana will be assigned the same base level category of someone who has 10-
20 grams of heroin, for a ratio of 1,000-1. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL § 2D1.1 (Nov. 2018), https://www.ussc.gov/guidelines/2018-guidelines-man-
ual/2018-chapter-2-d#NaN. 
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judges alone. The 600-page Guidelines Manual, published by the Com-
mission, is replete with adjustments that can affect a sentence.178 This 
section addresses how the Guidelines take into account an offender’s 
criminal history, one of the more significant ways in which a Guideline 
range can be altered, and how that criminal history might relate to the 
rate at which judges depart and vary downward.179  
The argument goes like this: a particular judge might be more 
willing to depart or vary for a particular offender with a lower criminal 
history category, and vice versa for an offender with a higher criminal 
history category. But the determination of an offender’s criminal history 
category in itself carries racial implications.180 The inherent racial biases 
built into an offender’s criminal history category can cause an 
overrepresentation of non-white offenders in the drug-crime statistics.181 
Part IV-A. shows how the Guidelines compute an offender’s criminal 
history and presents data from the District of Maryland.182 Part IV-B. 
discusses the problems with the “Career Offender” designation which 
can drastically alter an offender’s criminal history category and result 
in much higher sentences.183 Finally, Part IV-C. discusses over-policing 
in Baltimore City and how that further explains the higher criminal his-
tory categories among non-white drug offenders in Maryland.184  
A.  Criminal History Category: What the Data Shows 
Likely the most significant provision that can affect a particular 
Guideline range—other than the crime itself—is an offender’s criminal 
history.185 When computing an offender’s sentence, two things are taken 
into account: the offense level and the offender’s criminal history cate-
gory.186 Criminal history categories range from Category I, the least se-
rious, to Category VI, the most severe.187 A particular offender is 
 
178 U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL 2018 (Nov. 2018), 
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-manual/2018/GLMFull.pdf [herein-
after USSG]. 
179 See Outlaw, supra note 50, at 220. 
180 Id. 
181 See infra Part IV-C. 
182 See infra Part IV-A. 
183 See infra Part IV-B. 
184 See infra Part IV-C. 
185 See Outlaw, supra note 50, at 220 (stressing that “[q]ualifying as a career offender changes 
the entire landscape of a defendant’s prison exposure. It can transform a sentencing exposure 
that would normally be a few years into decades of imprisonment, and even life imprisonment”). 
186 See USSG, supra note 178, at 407. 
187 Id. 
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awarded a certain amount of “points” based on the offender’s prior rec-
ord, if the offender has one.188 If the crime at issue carries an offense 
level of 15, for instance, the Guideline range for an offender with a Cat-
egory I criminal history is 18-24 months in prison.189 However, if the 
same offense level was committed by an individual with a Category VI 
criminal history, that range increases to 41-51 months in prison.190 Table 
5 below shows the distribution of criminal history categories in each 
drug type in the District of Maryland. 
 
Table 5: Criminal History Category of Drug Offenders in Each Drug Type in 
the District of Maryland (2006-2017)191 
 
Drug Type Number I II III IV V VI 
Powder Cocaine 1,040 40.0 15.8 15.4 5.9 3.0 18.9 
Crack Cocaine 710 15.8 13.0 19.3 10.4 4.1 37.5 
Heroin 804 32.2 11.1 17.9 6.1 2.0 30.7 
Marijuana 214 55.6 10.3 13.1 7.9 1.9 11.2 
Methampheta-
mine 63 71.4 14.3 7.9 0.0 0.0 6.3 
Oxycodone/Ox-
ycontin 128 50.0 9.4 20.3 7.8 3.9 8.6 
PCP 67 17.9 14.9 22.4 9.0 6.0 29.9 
 
Most readily apparent is the high percentage of Category VI of-
fenders among drug types with the most non-white offenders versus 
drug types with the least non-white offenders.192 Crack Cocaine, Heroin, 
and PCP have, by far, the most offenders with the most Category VI 
designations, whereas Meth and Oxy have by far the fewest offenders 
with a Category VI designation.193 One could be forgiven for logically 
 
188 USSG, supra note 178, at 379–80. The instructions for determining the Criminal History 
Category are as follows: (a) Add 3 points for each prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding 
one year and one month. (b) Add 2 points for each prior sentence of imprisonment of at least 
sixty days not counted in (a). (c) Add 1 point for each prior sentence not counted in (a) or (b), 
up to a total of 4 points for this subsection. (d) Add 2 points if the defendant committed the 
instant offense while under any criminal justice sentence, including probation, parole, super-
vised release, imprisonment, work release, or escape status. (e) Add 1 point for each prior sen-
tence resulting from a conviction of a crime of violence that did not receive any points under 
(a), (b), or (c) above because such sentence was treated as a single sentence, up to a total of 3 
points for this subsection. Id. 
189 Id. at 407. 
190 Id. 
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concluding, then, that because non-white drug offenders have more se-
rious criminal histories, judges will be more reluctant to depart and vary 
downwards. Yet, it is important to note that being presented with an 
offender who is assigned a Category VI criminal history category, does 
not in any way hinder a judge’s ability to depart and vary downward. 
An offender’s criminal history category simply ‘moves the goal-posts’ 
of an offender’s potential sentence.194 Thus, in theory, the amplifying 
effect of an offender’s criminal history category should not drastically 
alter the rate of departures and variances, at least, not to the extent dis-
cussed in the prior section.  
Nevertheless, the above data suggests that one’s race can have 
an effect on one’s criminal history category, meaning the computation 
of one’s criminal history category has implicit bias built within it.195 One 
way this plays out is when offenders qualify as a “career offender.” 
B. The Problematic “Career Offender” Guideline 
The Guidelines section on computing a defendant’s criminal his-
tory contains a subsection that can greatly increase an offender’s crimi-
nal history category, even if prior convictions are for relatively innocu-
ous crimes.196 This subsection outlines the problems inherent in the 
“career offender” guideline.197 In order to qualify as a career offender, a 
defendant must meet three requirements: 
A defendant is a career offender if (1) the defendant was 
at least eighteen years old at the time the defendant com-
mitted the instant offense of conviction; (2) the instant 
offense of conviction is a felony that is either a crime of 
violence or a controlled substance offense; and (3) the 
defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of ei-
ther a crime of violence or a controlled substance of-
fense.198  
Subsection B of the provision further states that once an offender 
qualifies as a career offender, the offender’s criminal history category 
 
194 See Outlaw, supra note 50, at 219 n.9. 
195 See COMBINED SOURCEBOOKS, supra note 5. 
196 See Outlaw, supra note 50, at 225 (“[A] defendant with two priors for selling small amount 
of drugs is subject to the same offense level, criminal history category, and therefore presumed 
sentencing range, as a defendant with two priors for rape, murder, or arson”). 
197 USSG, supra note 178, at 395–96. 
198 Id. at 395. 
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automatically becomes Category VI, the most severe category, greatly 
increasing the Guideline range.199  
The career offender provision, however, is “fraught with poten-
tial imprecision” due to the incredible amount of predicate crimes that 
can qualify.200 As a result, there is the “potential for wide discrepancy 
in the gravity of past antisocial conduct among career offenders.”201 For 
instance, an offender who has two prior convictions for violent assaults 
will be subjected to the same career offender enhancement as an of-
fender who has two prior convictions for street-level drug sales.202 On 
some level, the inclusion of “a crime of violence” makes sense as a pred-
icate felony that would qualify one as a career offender; if an individual 
is routinely violent and past sentences have not abated the problem, the 
interest in keeping the public safe overtakes any interest in rehabilita-
tion.  
What is more problematic, however, is the inclusion of a “con-
trolled substance offense” as the only other set of predicate felonies that 
would qualify an offender.203 The presumption that drug offenses are 
inextricably linked to violent offenses, a substantial reason why drug 
offenders are coupled with violent offenders in the career offender cat-
egory, has been shown to be without merit.204 Furthermore, the percent-
age of controlled substance offenders who are non-white greatly out-
weigh the percentage of white offenders, whereas white-collar crimes, 
which can be arguably be as harmful as drug offenses, are committed 
predominately by white offenders.205  
 
199 Id. One caveat is that in order to automatically be assigned a criminal history category of 
VI, one’s offense must be otherwise lesser than offense levels stated in a table outlined in the 
subsection, but it would be rare for this not to occur unless the predicate offense is a serious one 
such as murder. Id. 
200 United States v. Adkins, 937 F.2d 947, 952 (4th Cir. 1991). 
201 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
202 See Outlaw, supra note 50, at 225. 
203 Adkins, 937 F.2d at 952. 
204 Outlaw, supra note 50, at 230. 
205 See Norman Abrams, Assessing the Federal Government’s “War” on White-Collar Crime, 
53 TEMP. L. Q. 984, 1001, 1006–07 (1980) (quoting White Collar Crime: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. On Crime of the House Comm. on Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 65–66 (1978) 
(testimony of Deputy Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti) (“Some in our society erroneously 
assume that white-collar offenses affect only the money or property rights of affluent individuals 
or the public or private institutions who can well afford the loss. Such offenses, however, have 
both a direct and indirect impact on all social classes and often inflict their greatest harm on the 
poor, the infirm and other segments of society that can least afford it. Further, the impact of 
white-collar illegality extends beyond simply pecuniary loss. Corruption of government offi-
cials can affect the quality of our food and the safety of our homes. Such illegality also has 
invidious effect on the public’s perception of the integrity of our political, economic, social and 
governmental institutions. Official corruption invariably involves breaches of trust, either in the 
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A primary motivation behind the career offender guideline is the 
desire to impose “especially long sentence[s] upon those who have com-
mitted prior offenses” in order to deter where prior punishments have 
failed to.206 However, this preconception is not reflected in the reality of 
the career offender guideline. First, there is a strong likelihood that an 
offender with two prior convictions for low-level drug dealing will have 
spent no time in prison before being labeled a career-offender.207 Upon 
a third conviction, that individual will be assigned a Category VI crim-
inal history and will likely face an enormous prison enhancement de-
spite never having served any time in prison. In order to achieve the 
desired deterrence effect, there must be “an appropriate relationship be-
tween the sentence for the current offense and the sentences . . . for the 
prior offenses.”208 In the aforementioned scenario, the career offender 
guideline is not serving its function because there has not been a real 
attempt to deter the offender in the previous two convictions.  
Another primary motivation behind the career offender guide-
line is to reduce recidivism.209 Yet, the data shows that drug offenders 
do not recidivate with greater frequency than others, and in fact, recidi-
vate less than other offenders who have criminal history categories of 
VI.210 The Sentencing Commission itself has conceded that the career 
offender guidelines “makes the criminal history category a less perfect 
 
legal or moral sense, and such offenses generate in the public a deep sense of betrayal and dis-
appointment. When an elected official accepts a bribe, a bank official abuses his position for 
personal gain, a corporate officer engages in illicit activity, or an employed worker fraudulently 
obtains unemployment insurance benefits, we as citizens feel cheated. Such public perceptions 
are fertile ground for the development of widespread public cynicism and a conviction that the 
entire economic and political system is corrupt and lacks integrity. It is precisely because white-
collar offenses have the capacity to subvert the basic assumptions of our institutions and drain 
our national will that I consider white-collar illegality to be one of our most urgent law enforce-
ment problems”)). 
206 United States v. Mishoe, 241 F.3d 214, 220 (2d Cir. 2001). 
207 See COMBINED SOURCEBOOKS, supra note 5. 
208 Mishoe, 241 F.3d at 220. 
209 Outlaw, supra note 50, at 60, 228. 
210 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING: AN ASSESSMENT 
OF HOW WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF 
SENTENCING REFORM 134 (Nov. 2004), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-
and-publications/research-projects-and-surveys/miscellaneous/15-year-
study/15_year_study_full.pdf  (“[T]he recidivism rates of drug trafficking offenders sentenced 
under the career offender guideline based on prior drug convictions shows that their rates are 
much lower than other offenders who are assigned to criminal history category VI. The overall 
rate of recidivism for category VI offenders two years after release from prison is 55 percent. 
The rate for offenders qualifying for the career criminal guideline based on one or more violent 
offenses is about 52 percent. But the rate for offenders qualifying only on the basis of prior drug 
offenses is only 27 percent”) (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted). 
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measure of recidivism risk than it would be without the inclusion of of-
fenders qualifying only because of prior drug offenses.”211 
Overall, while an offender’s criminal history can help explain 
the large disparity outlined in the previous section, it too involves im-
plicit racial biases. The inclusion of drug offenses as a predicate felony 
under the career offender guideline unfairly punishes minority groups 
by overrepresenting a particular offender’s criminal history.212 The ca-
reer offender guideline becomes further problematic when one consid-
ers that minority populations are more often subject to increased police 
surveillance resulting in more arrests and convictions, as is the reality 
in Baltimore, Maryland.213  
C. Over-Policing of Baltimore City 
Another explanation for the disparity in criminal history catego-
ries in the U.S. District of Maryland is Baltimore’s infamous over-po-
licing problem. Baltimore City is an over-policed city.214 In 2016, the 
Baltimore Police Department employed 41 officers for every 10,000 
residents, which at the time was the fourth highest rate of any police 
department in the country with over 500 officers.215 Most of the over-
policing, however, is concentrated in predominantly African American 
neighborhoods.216  
Following the death of Freddie Gray and the ensuing civil unrest 
in Baltimore in April 2015, the Department of Justice launched an in-
vestigation into the practices of the Baltimore City Police Department 
(“BPD”).217 In a 164-page report, the DOJ details its conclusions, find-
ing that there is “reasonable cause to believe that BPD engages in a pat-
tern or practice of conduct that violates the Constitution or federal 
law.”218 Among the alleged practices was “using enforcement strategies 
that produce severe and unjustified disparities in the rates of stops, 
 
211 Id. (emphasis in original). 
212 Outlaw, supra note 50, at 229. 
213 See infra Part IV-C. 
214 See infra note 218. 
215 Scott Beyer, In Baltimore, Police Seem Everywhere and Nowhere at Once, GOVERNING 
(Nov. 2018), https://www.governing.com/columns/urban-notebook/gov-baltimore-police-para-
dox.html. 
216 See infra note 218. 
217 Del Quentin Wilber & Kevin Rector, Justice Department report: Baltimore police routinely 
violated civil rights, BALT. SUN (Aug. 9, 2016), https://www.baltimoresun.com/maryland/balti-
more-city/bs-md-ci-doj-report-20160809-story.html. 
218 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., C.R. DIVISION, INVESTIGATION OF THE BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEP’T 
3 (Aug 10, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/883296/download [hereinafter 
INVESTIGATION OF THE BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEP’T]. 
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searches and arrests of African Americans[.]”219 Moreover, the concen-
tration of these stops, searches, and arrests occur in “predominantly Af-
rican-American neighborhoods.”220  
The report also notes that BPD’s unabated targeting of African 
American neighborhoods “disproportionately harms African-American 
residents.”221 Because BPD stopped African American residents “three 
times as often as white residents,” African Americans accounted for 
86% of “all criminal offenses” despite comprising only 63% of the city’s 
population.222 Furthermore, the report found that there were “large racial 
disparities in BPD’s arrests for drug possession.”223 For instance, BPD 
arrested African Americans for drug possession at five times the rate of 
others, despite survey data showing that African Americans “use drugs 
at rates similar to or slightly exceeding other population groups.”224  
This “over-policing,” can result in an overrepresentation of the 
over-policed group in criminal statistics. In Baltimore, the result is an 
overrepresentation of African Americans in the criminal justice system 
which produces deep distrust between law enforcement and the African 
American community which thus exacerbates the problem.225 Over-po-
licing can help explain why the Maryland criminal history statistics are 
so severely skewed in showing an overrepresentation of minority 
groups. African Americans are stopped, searched, and arrested more of-
ten, resulting in more convictions, with a particular emphasis on drug-
related crimes.  
CONCLUSION 
The motivation behind the enactment of the SRA and the prom-
ulgation of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines was a noble one.226 The need 
to narrow sentencing disparities represents overarching principles of 
 
219 Id. 
220 Id. at 5. In one of the more jarring statistics in the report, it was revealed that although the 
stops mostly occurred in African American neighborhoods, the neighborhoods encompassed a 
relatively “small portion of Baltimore residents.” Thus, “hundreds of individuals—nearly all of 
them African American—were stopped on at least 10 separate occasions” between 2010–2015, 
and “seven African-American men were stopped more than 30 times during this period” (em-
phasis added). Id. at 6. 
221 Id. at 7. 
222 Id. 
223 INVESTIGATION OF THE BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEP’T, supra note 218, at 8. 
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225 See THE WEST BALTIMORE COMM’N ON POLICE MISCONDUCT AND THE NO BOUNDARIES 
COALITION, OVER-POLICED YET UNDERSERVED 15 (Mar. 8, 2016), http://www.nobounda-
riescoalition.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/No-Boundaries-Layout-Web-1.pdf. 
226 See supra Part I. 
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equality and justice that should be reflected in the United States criminal 
justice system. However, since the passing of the SRA, sentencing dis-
parities persist and have real implications for defendants all over the 
country.227 In Maryland, drug offenders who are white receive greater 
leniency in federal court in the form of departures and variances than 
drug offenders who are non-white.228 This is a disconcerting realization 
which needs to be addressed if the goal of the SRA and the Guidelines 
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